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Cyber LayerZero bridge drains 5,213,000 CYBER, Upbit and Bithumb freeze

An unexpected mint on Solana and a matching outflow from Cyber's Ethereum lockbox left an attacker holding 575 ETH, ~$968K, within an hour.

by 4 min read

Cross-chain social protocol Cyber told users on November 21 to stop using its bridge after 5,213,000 CYBER were minted on Solana and the same amount was transferred out of its Ethereum lockbox a few minutes later. The attacker sold most of the tokens on-chain for about 575.29 ETH (~$968,000) before South Korean exchanges Upbit and Bithumb suspended CYBER deposits and withdrawals.

What happened

  • Solana mint, Ethereum outflow. Per The Block's tracing, 5,213,000 CYBER were minted on Solana at 11:13 ET (16:13 UTC) in tx TzMKUZhibQNADjETHhe1QiNp4NPpgAkyHivrJu2CJuToK7gFZMB3nFe3UR9UjpMHGLdTKE8wig5C9M9BRBpsF1F. About two minutes later the same amount left the CyberTokenAdapter contract that holds CYBER for the token's LayerZero bridge on Ethereum, in tx 0x92a1b430c066cbfb636f67f5354b1720c47e6075523551d9f47bb03bcdc20737.
  • Sold through KyberSwap and MetaMask Swaps. Over the following hour, the attacker's address — funded for the first time less than an hour before the transfer — sold the drained tokens via KyberSwap and MetaMask Swaps, with a second wallet also selling. Three unlabeled addresses received about 412,000 CYBER on the way out.
  • ETH parked in a fresh wallet. At 12:40 ET, 575.29 ETH were sent to a new address in tx 0xfba2151e4018b46ecc51f85645c5fa18820dc412d16f87119431067a87fa7f65.
  • Cyber's status update, 13:25 ET. The team posted on X that CYBER had been "unexpectedly minted" on Solana and the matching amount moved out of the Ethereum lockbox. It asked users to avoid the bridge and not to deposit CYBER to exchanges, and said no wallet signing, migration or claim action is required.

Mechanism — what the LayerZero bridge is supposed to do

CyberTokenAdapter is the Ethereum-side lockbox for CYBER's LayerZero OFT (Omnichain Fungible Token) bridge. The design is lock-and-mint: tokens sent cross-chain are held on the source side while an equivalent amount is minted on the destination chain, with a LayerZero endpoint verifying the message. A mint on Solana that is not matched by a legitimate lock on Ethereum, followed by a withdrawal that drains the lockbox, is consistent with an attacker who could either produce a valid cross-chain message or who controls the authority that mints CYBER on Solana. The team has not stated which of the two failed; the public artifacts so far describe an outcome, not a root cause.

Impact

  • Token holders. The sold supply is already circulating as ETH; Crypto Briefing puts the amount at roughly 5.21 million unbacked CYBER that reached the open market before trading venues reacted.
  • Exchanges. Upbit suspended CYBER deposits and withdrawals on Ethereum and issued an investment-caution notice, with trading still open. Bithumb halted deposits and withdrawals and left trading on.
  • Bridge counterparties. Any venue holding CYBER inventory bridged in the last few hours is holding an asset whose peg to the Ethereum lockbox has broken until the team can account for the supply gap.

What to watch

  1. A Cyber post-mortem naming the authority or message path that was abused. Until the team states whether a Solana mint authority, a LayerZero message, or a lockbox withdrawal path was compromised, the fix is not scoped.
  2. The attacker's fresh ETH wallet. The 575.29 ETH sat in a new address at the end of the sequence; movement into Tornado Cash or a cross-chain mixer would be the next observable step.
  3. Upbit and Bithumb reopening. CYBER was still trading on both venues when deposits were frozen; a decision to delist or to resume rails will set what the recovered supply, if any, trades against.

Context

Cross-chain bridge failures of this shape — where unbacked supply appears on a destination chain before the source lockbox drains — have their own lineage: Nomad in August 2022 and Harmony Horizon in June 2022 both began as destination-side problems and ended as a drained lock. The scale here is smaller, but the sequence is the same: mint first, source outflow second.

Sources: The Block, Crypto Briefing, The Defiant.

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