Skip to content

exploit

Safe multisig drained for ~$6.45M through Zodiac Roles permissions, Zodiac blames key compromise

A Safe multisig lost ~$4.3M USDC and ~$1.7M syrupUSDC on Nov 16 when an attacker used an already-granted Zodiac Roles permission. Safe says contracts unaffected; Zodiac blames a compromised key.

by 4 min read

A Safe (formerly Gnosis Safe) multisig was drained for roughly $6.45 million on November 16, via the Zodiac Roles permission module rather than a signature over the Safe itself. PeckShield first flagged the transfers; on-chain analyst Specter traced the outflows back to permissions already configured on the wallet. Safe's core contracts and the Safe{Wallet} app were not involved. Zodiac's co-founder says the signing key of a long-standing role member was most likely compromised.

What happened

The multisig held yield-bearing stablecoins. In a single window, an attacker moved roughly $4.3 million in USDC and $1.7 million in syrupUSDC (Maple Finance's yield wrapper on USDC) out of the Safe without triggering the normal multisig threshold. The transfers were signed by an address that already held a Zodiac Roles role on the vault — a permission the Safe's owners had granted at some earlier point so that the role-holder could execute a bounded set of transactions without the full quorum.

  • Loss: ~$6.45M total (headline figure from PeckShield; the itemized ~$4.3M USDC + ~$1.7M syrupUSDC sums below the headline and the gap has not been reconciled publicly).
  • Trigger: a transaction signed by the compromised role key, inside the permissions the role already held.
  • Owner signatures needed: none. The attacker did not need to break the Safe's m-of-n.

The Safe team said on X that "our smart contracts and the Safe{Wallet} app were not affected" and that the Zodiac Roles module involved was deployed and configured outside Safe{Wallet}. Zodiac's co-founder Auryn Macmillan said the module itself has no known vulnerability and attributed the drain to a compromised key, not a module bug.

Mechanism — how Zodiac Roles works

Zodiac Roles is a modifier contract installed on a Safe as a module. Owners of the Safe define "roles," each a scoped permission set: a role might be allowed to call transfer on a specific ERC-20 to a specific address, or to interact with a specific DeFi protocol, but nothing else. The role is held by one or more signer addresses. A tx signed by a role-holder, within that role's scope, executes through the Safe without needing the owners' multisig threshold.

The attack surface this creates: the Safe's threshold is no longer the only signing fence. Each role-holder key is a separate failure mode, and the blast radius of a compromised role key is whatever that role was allowed to do. Here, the role was evidently authorized to move the Safe's USDC and syrupUSDC positions.

On-chain laundering trail

The proceeds moved through two laundering routes already known from this quarter's exploits:

  • PeckShield traced roughly $813,000 to XMR-adjacent tokens bought on Hyperliquid (XMR1, the perp venue's Monero proxy, following the same path the Lighter exploiter used on November 16).
  • Specter separately reported roughly $1.2 million of the proceeds converted to Monero via Wagyu, a privacy-oriented cross-chain router.

No actor has been publicly named. The attacker's address is a single externally owned account with the role credential; whether it was phished, pulled from a dev machine, or taken from a service wallet is still open.

Impact and open questions

  1. Scope of exposure: whether other Safes using Zodiac Roles with similarly scoped stablecoin permissions are at risk depends entirely on their own key hygiene. Zodiac's position is that the module is sound.
  2. Role audit: Safe owners using Zodiac Roles should list every active role, the key behind it, and revoke any role whose signer custody isn't equal to the Safe's own.
  3. Second-layer threshold: the practical takeaway for high-value Safes is that a role-holder key's security must match, not undercut, the multisig's own threshold.

Context

This is the second high-profile "permissions module, not signature, as the attack surface" incident on Safe this year. The Squid/SquidRouterModule exploit in May drained roughly $3.2 million from 86 Safes on Ethereum and Base through a third-party module that was not vetted by Safe Labs. The Gnosis Pay / Zodiac Delay module incident in June hit a different Zodiac module on the Gnosis Pay product, though the loss figure there was never itemized. The pattern — Safe core is fine, modules added to Safes are the way in — now has three data points in six months. Module hygiene is the live problem.

Sources

Related stories