exploit
Wagyu XMR1 wrapped Monero drains 99% after $13M deployer-key breach
Wagyu's XMR1 collapsed from ~$494 to $1 on Friday after an attacker moved 5.2M tokens from the deployer wallet; founder PerpetualCow blames a breach at Icelandic host 1984.
Wagyu's wrapped-Monero token XMR1, traded on Hyperliquid, collapsed about 99% on the morning of Friday, November 20 after an attacker drained the token's deployer wallet. Pseudonymous Wagyu founder PerpetualCow said the deployer key was exposed by a breach at Icelandic hosting provider 1984, and has promised personal refunds. Native Monero (XMR) is unaffected.
What happened
On-chain forensics firm Bitquery traced the sequence (Bitquery investigation referenced by Decrypt):
- A recipient account was funded with roughly 0.098 ETH out of Tornado Cash at 04:30 CET and deployed at 04:38.
- Between 05:46 and 06:16 CET, the XMR1 deployer wallet sent 5.2 million XMR1 to that recipient.
- Selling began at 05:49. About 364,000 XMR1 were sold on Hyperliquid for roughly $13.5 million in USDC, taking the token from around $494 to under $1 inside the 30-minute window.
- Proceeds bridged from Arbitrum to Ethereum, were swapped into ~7,350 ETH, and sit in three wallets — one holding ~4,836 ETH — unmoved at publication.
The Block puts the figure at about $13M and ~7,500 ETH bought with the proceeds (The Block), tracking on-chain data from Lookonchain. 388 buyers absorbed the sell, per Bitquery.
The attributed cause
PerpetualCow's own account, posted on X and relayed by both outlets:
"The XMR1 deployer key was held on an OLD server on there that I DELETED, but somehow the logs/files were still kept."
He attributes the exposure to a breach at 1984.hosting (operated by 1984 ehf in Reykjavík). Icelandic outlets DV and mbl.is reported that 1984 suspended services on Friday after what the host itself described as an "extensive cyberattack." That confirms the host outage; it does not independently confirm that the XMR1 deployer key was among what was taken. Bitquery notes on-chain data cannot say whether the key was stolen or used from the inside.
The same deployer wallet still controls nearly all of ZEC1, Wagyu's wrapped-Zcash token. Wagyu had previously disclosed a separate data leak in October, saying funds were not affected at that time.
The numbers
- Price: ~$494 → under $1 (~99.8% drop), roughly 30 minutes from first sell.
- Moved from deployer: 5,200,000 XMR1.
- Sold: ~364,000 XMR1 for ~$13.28M USDC (per Bitquery; The Block cites "around $13M").
- ETH held by attacker: ~7,350 ETH across three addresses, untouched.
- Attacker funding source: ~0.098 ETH via Tornado Cash.
- Buyers hit: 388.
- Hyperliquid status: Wagyu's own front end was showing "temporarily unavailable" at publication.
PerpetualCow said affected users will be refunded "personally" and Wagyu will "relaunch later." No timetable has been given, and no on-chain evidence of refunds has appeared yet.
What to watch
- ETH consolidation moves. The three attacker wallets hold ~7,350 ETH. Any routing to Tornado Cash, Privacy Cash, Railgun, or a THORChain → BTC swap would be the next on-chain signal.
- Reserve proof. Bitquery flags that the amount of native Monero actually backing the remaining XMR1 supply is not publicly verifiable. A Wagyu attestation — not a tweet — would matter.
- 1984 incident scope. Whether the host's post-mortem explicitly names Wagyu as affected, and what data categories (private keys, config files, both) were taken, decides the scope. Other 1984 tenants should assume exposure until the post-mortem is public.
- ZEC1 deployer migration. Nearly all of Wagyu's wrapped Zcash sits under the same deployer. A visible key rotation or a migration to a fresh deployer with on-chain attestation is the minimum required to avoid a second drain on the same template.
Context
This is a wrapped-asset issuer collapse driven by operational security on a single key, not a bug in Hyperliquid or in Monero itself. In that sense it's closer in shape to BadgerDAO (2021) or Ronin Network's validator key compromise than to a smart-contract exploit — a reminder that wrapped-asset models concentrate counterparty risk on the issuer's key management, whichever chain the wrapper lives on.